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                             Luigi Auriemma

Application:  Iconics GENESIS32 and GENESIS64
              http://www.iconics.com/Home/Products/HMI-and-SCADA/GENESIS32.aspx
              http://www.iconics.com/Home/Products/HMI-and-SCADA/GENESIS64.aspx
Versions:     GENESIS32 <= 9.21
              GENESIS64 <= 10.51
              GenBroker.exe and GenBroker64.exe are the same version on
              both the softwares: 9.21.201.01
Platforms:    Windows
Bug:          integer overflow
Exploitation: remote, versus server
Date:         21 Mar 2011 (found 08 Jan 2011)
Author:       Luigi Auriemma
              e-mail: aluigi@autistici.org
              web:    aluigi.org


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1) Introduction
2) Bug
3) The Code
4) Fix


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===============
1) Introduction
===============


Iconics Genesis is a SCADA HMI solution used worldwide with customers
that go from Beijing Traffic Control Center to the Pentagon and even
Poste Italiane ("Case Studies" source).

Informations from the vendor's website:
"GENESIS32 is the industrys first and only fully scalable suite of
OPC, SNMP, BACnet and Web-enabled HMI and SCADA applications."


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======
2) Bug
======


GenBroker is a Windows service running on port 38080.

The addresses and code snippets reported here are referred to GENESIS32
9.2.

The service is affected by an integer overflow vulnerability during the
handling of the opcodes 3f0, 138F,1390,1391,1392,1393,
1394, 1C86, 89a,89b, 450,451,454,455, 1C20,1C24 that make use of the
function 0044d1c0.

The problem is caused by the allocation of the memory needed for the
creation of an array trusting the number of elements passed by the
client.

The resulting memory corruptions (like direct registry calls, memory
locations calls, writing of data in arbitrary locations and so on)
allow code execution.

Fields in the packet:
  the format of the packets depend by the relative opcodes, the
  function 0044d1c0 reads a 32bit before the one used for the
  allocation.

Vulnerable code:
  0044D2A2  |.  E8 C99EFCFF   CALL 00417170                 ; get 32bit
  0044D2A7  |.  8D4424 1C     LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+1C]
  0044D2AB  |.  50            PUSH EAX
  0044D2AC  |.  8BCE          MOV ECX,ESI
  0044D2AE  |.  E8 BD9EFCFF   CALL 00417170
  0044D2B3  |.  8B4C24 10     MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+10]
  0044D2B7  |.  8D14CD 000000>LEA EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[ECX*8]  ; * 8
  0044D2BE  |.  52            PUSH EDX
  0044D2BF  |.  E8 F49E0500   CALL <JMP.&MFC71U.#265>       ; malloc


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===========
3) The Code
===========


http://aluigi.org/poc/genesis_iof.zip

  genesis_iof 1 SERVER


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======
4) Fix
======


No fix.


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